Human judgement is better described as a heuristic process rather than maximisation of a utility function. Heuristics are high cognitive processes of decision-making whose rapid and effortless implementation is useful to confront risk scenarios that compromise the viability of an individual. They can be defined in an enactive frame as self-sustained and selfgenerated habits of abductive behaviour selection in sensorimotor agents influenced by the individual history of sensorimotor contingencies and the environment. In this work, we analyse the emergence of patterns of behaviour and its necessary ecological conditions when performed decisions are related to energy intake and energy expenditure. Agent's sensors and intentions are coupled to a variation of the iterant deformable sensorimotor medium (IDSM) (Egbert and . This model explains transparently the generation of sensorimotor habits in simulated robots through the influence of registers of previously executed behaviours reinforced by repetition. We create a decision-making frame based on intentions as probabilities of specific actions which constitute the motor component of sensorimotor states on IDSM. In this model is seen that specific behaviour correlations with the lifespan of agents depend on the availability of energetic sources on the environment. Inheritance of the medium is introduced in agents with a small improvement on the lifespan of agents.
Introduction
Human decision making is a complex process that goes beyond the maximisation of probabilistic utility functions. The traditional "rational" judgement method is intractable in practice due to the amount of information and cognitive capacities that would be required in natural scenarios. Many species (humans beings among them) constantly face decisions that compromise their survival and somehow they remain. The apparently non-optimal decision making performed by organisms works fine at least in ecological terms. Alternative models of decision making were developed considering efficiency and immediacy as key features. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) first describe cognitive bias in human judgement, a decision-making process which simplify original problems substituting complex attributes by other computationally less demanding. The idea of bias evolved from the original conception of a complementary intuitive process triggered by individual limitations to the concept of heuristics: self-consistent cognitive processes that can generate the best outputs when environmental conditions are coupled (Cosmides and Tooby, 1994; Reyna, 2004; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011) . Human heuristics arise with a minimum effort and are applied immediately due to their accessibility. These features make them valuable in decisions under risk or uncertainty. Despite the explanatory power of heuristics, their formation has not been dealt in depth.
In an eco-cognitive perspective heuristics can be framed as manipulative abduction processes (Magnani, 2015) . Manipulative abduction happens "... when we are thinking through doing and no only, in a pragmatic sense, about doing ... Manipulative abduction refers to an extra-theoretical behaviour that aims at creating communicable accounts of new experiences to integrate them into previously existing systems of experimental and linguistics (theoretical) practices" (Magnani, 2009) . Action in heuristics can provide information unavailable by orthodox mechanisms based on the logical inference from axioms. Heuristics are selective or creative models i.e. select already conceived hypothesis or generates new ones. The epistemological value of heuristics has been questioned for its apparent ignorance-preserving nature despite its practical power to enhance knowledge empirically exploiting ecological regularities (Magnani, 2015) . McCarthy (1981) recognises the utility of separation between epistemological and heuristic problems in artificial intelligence due to the lack of a formalisation of common sense in the classical paradigm of mind. The computational theory of mind explains cognition as the processing of representational states of the world as in a computational system (Cohen and Feigenbaum, 2014) . Under this approach, any decision-making process besides utility maximisation is not supposed to produce optimal nor sustainable outputs, but that is actually what occurs. The strict classification on "rational decisions" and "remaining processes" makes the second category ambiguous and prohibits a reliable characterisation of truly intentional, ecologically-successful decisionmaking. What is missing to understand the nature of any emergent cognitive process is an approach which takes in account embodiment and experience. The enactive view to cognition fulfils these conditions offering a paradigm with no a priori assumptions on the hierarchy of decision-making processes.
Enactivism is built based on the concepts of embodiment, autonomy, subjective experience and sense-making (Di Paolo et al., 2010) . The enactive identity on a system comes from the operational closure of the network of selfproduced and self-maintained processes. Those are coupled with the environment in a sensorimotor loop regulated by the system itself. Cognition happens when non-passive interaction loop is truly intentional, and this can be possible if the system lives in precarious conditions (Di Paolo et al., 2010; Stewart, 2010) . The cognitive process has the world as its own model instead of symbolic representation. Then the system creates meaning when perceiving. This agrees with the immediate accessibility on intuitive reasoning making the enactive approach appealing to study the formation of heuristics.
Froese and Ziemke (2009) state two principles in the design of enactive artificial intelligence: (EAI-1) Agents must be capable of generating its own systemic identity at some level, and (EAI-2) must have the capacity to actively regulate its ongoing sensorimotor interaction in relation to a viability constraint. De Loor et al. (2009) suggest that the regulation of the sensorimotor interaction must modify the environment too, sometimes irreversibly. Is it possible to address heuristic behaviours within these principles describing them as self-maintaining precarious systems of judgement actively regulated by a sensorimotor loop which resemble habits of decision-making. The concept of habit has not a universally accepted definition but is possible to recognise two branches on the historical development of it: An explanation of habit as an automatic association and an organicist and ecological definition which links self-organising structures with the agent and the environment in a co-evolving relationship (Barandiaran and Di Paolo, 2014) . Following the former trend, Egbert and Barandiaran (2014) developed an enactive model that represents habits of sensorimotor contingencies: the Interant Deformable Sensorimotor Medium (IDSM). This system has two main features: (1) Sensorimotor states are points of a continuous space representing a history of sensory inputs and motor activity, at a mesoscopic level (2) a weighted record of sensorimotor states associated with sensorimotor changes which influence agents future actions according to her present state. Habits appear as self-reinforcing repetitive patterns of behaviour in the sensorimotor space. Reinforcement depends on how frequently and/or recently a pattern of behaviour has been performed. IDSM has been implemented to represent living organisms with sensory inputs of metabolic variables with no specification of the life-sustaining role of this particular sensorimotor dimension (Egbert and Canamero, 2014) . Such that sys-tems are more likely to keep agents and sensorimotor habits into their respective viability region. This result suggests that cognitive and biological structures could be deeply integrated sharing essential variables.
We model agents as living organisms which take decisions with bounded cognitive capacities, limited information and an environment demanding rapid responses. The aim of this paper is to analyse the effect of history-based control on the willingness to perform an action. To determine whether is possible to generate such that influence on intentions we employ an variation of IDSM where the strict relation between sensory activation and motor action is substituted by a relation between the sensory activation and the probability to perform the motor action. To portray the effects of this change we use the formalised sensorimotor coupling between environment (e), agent bodily configuration (p), internal state (a) and sensory (s) and motor states (m) proposed by (Buhrmann et al., 2013 )ė = E(e, p),ṡ = S(e, a),ȧ = A(a, s),ṁ = M (a),ṗ = B(m, e) which permits the operational description of four types of sensorimotor contingencies (SMCs). Changingṁ = M (a) for an stochastic function weakens the lawful closure of the sensorimotor loop but the sensorimotor contingencies still can be formulated without a mayor problem as the relationship S(e, a) remains unchanged. The main advantage of the redefinition of the motor dynamic is that it gives the system a physical indeterminacy which opens an space for the subjectivity of the simulated enactive agent (Froese and Taguchi, 2019 ). The decision model as described also can show an irreversible co-evolution of agent, heuristics (as habits) and environment (De Loor et al., 2009) .
A decision-making habit tied to a decision problem involving the viability of the agent is likely to be integrated into the identity cycle of both, the agent and the habit (Egbert and Canamero, 2014). We model agents whose actions are related with essential variables and whose sensory inputs integrate the recognition of the proximity with the viability limits of essential variables. An organism with this characteristics can develop an adaptive stochastic behaviourchanging mechanism to keep essential variables on the viability region. This process of adaptation in the system agrees with a broader definition of an ultrastable system proposed by (Izquierdo et al., 2013) in which the separation between parameter-changing and behaviour-producing mechanisms is no longer required.
The decision-making problems modelled in this work are the energy intake and the execution of movement with an energetic expenditure, both related to long-term energy imbalance. The energy of the agent is evidently an essential variable: A living organism that approaches zero energy starts to experience a malfunction and eventually death. Some living systems accumulate energy surplus in their bodies as structural components or as reserves for periods of scarcity. Humans store energy excess as fat reserves which, if the surplus is maintained, can cause an increase in general and specificdisease related mortality (Flegal et al., 2005 (Flegal et al., , 2007 . The asymmetrical conflict between drives that increase and reduce energy reservoirs suggests a natural tendency to store as much energy as possible. The dynamics of available energetic sources also play a role in shaping long term behaviour. For example, a constant strategy consisting in always attempt to eat can keep an agent into the viability region and can avoid the accumulation of excessive energy reserves in an environment with a physically or temporally sparse distribution of food. In this case, the success of such that decision making strategy relies on the high uncertainty of the achievement of the objectives. Agents face this decision process with limited information and a perceived signal of the internal energy in the form of unpleasant states that trigger a feeding action (stop or start eating). The limited available information comes from their embodiment and situatedness but is plausible to assume that at least part of this information is transmitted from ancestral organisms as a phenotype of behaviour or a cultural context. We study if the congenital trends of behaviour could be translated into an ecological advantage in particular environments. The main environmental feature studied in this work is the availability of energetic sources.
Agent model
Agents are embedded in a one-dimensional physical environment divided into cells with periodic boundary conditions. Every cell have one energetic source. If the source is eaten, the internal energy of the agent who ate it is increased by E s and a new source can grow in the empty cell with a probability p g .
Energy expenditure of agent α at time t is composed of a basal metabolic spending M b E max (α) plus a cost for movement C m E α (t) if movement is performed.The basal energy price, required for the maintenance of the vital functions of the agent is equal to the product of a constant M b times the maximum level of energy ever reached by the agent E max (α) at the present time. The change on energy at a unit of time is given by the following expression,
where X eat and X move are random variables equal one when the agent eats and moves, respectively, and zero otherwise. When agent reaches zero energy she dies. Then, as the internal energy is the only essential variable, the viability region is defined by E α > 0.
Agents can eat the energetic source found in the cell, can move to one of the two neighbour cells (the agent randomly decides whether to move to the right or to the left), can perform both actions or none at every unit of time. The agent's IDSM controls the volition of every action. It is compound by nodes (not related with the concept of node or vertex in graph theory) which are records of the combination of sensorimotor states and consequent changes on them. The medium maps a sensorimotor state to a motor output f t (S t , M t ) → M t+1 and the mapping itself change as a function ∆f ∆t = g(f, S, M, ∆S ∆t , ∆M ∆t ) so the trajectories bias the reinforcement of particular paths of sensorimotor activity (Egbert, 2018 ). In the system, the sensory state only depends on the internal energy E α . S(E α (t)) is a sigmoidal function centred on a threshold value E t , which represents a soft limit on energy that triggers the sensation of hunger.
where A and B are such that S(E t ) = 0.5. The sensory signal lead every possible value of E α (t) into the range (0, 1) (Fig. 1) . The concept of motor dimension was adapted to include the intention to perform an action. The motor state is represented by two independent probabilities to consume energy p c and to move p m instead of the actual actions of consuming and moving. I keep the term "motor" to refer the probabilities of action and the term "sensorimotor" to refer the complete sensory-intentional structure of agents' dynamics. Then the resulting sensorimotor space is threedimensional with one sensory and two motor dimensions. Nodes are tuples of two vectors and one scalar: N p and N v ; the sensorimotor state and the sensorimotor velocity that an agent experience when the node is created, respectively, and N ω ; the weighting of the node (which is zero when the node is created). By the construction of the sensorimotor space, every component of the state lies in [0, 1].
New nodes are added to the medium if the node density φ(x) (eq. 3) is less than a threshold k t = 1. This function combines a factor of the weight of node (eq.4) and a factor related with the distance of the current state of the agent x and the state of a given node N p (eq. 5). In these simulations the values of k ω and k d are 1000 and 0.0025 as in the original IDSM model (Egbert and Barandiaran, 2014) . The weight of each node is updated according the following expression,
whose parameters k deg = 1, k rej = 10 are related to the degradation of the weight of the node if the agent does not visit it frequently and with the rejuvenation of the weight when the agent is close. After a node is added to the medium it remains inactive during ten temporal units to avoid its effects to fully overshadows the rest of the nodes. The influence of IDSM in the motor state of the agent is:
where φ * (x) is the node density of the N * active nodes and superindex µ means that only the motor components of the vector are taken. Medium net influence is built by the weighted effect of every active node in the agent's sensorimotor state. Node influence has two factors: One which throws agent away from node meanwhile a second one attracts it to the node. The motor states, the nodes and the medium (annexation of nodes) are updated continuously. As actions are performed (according the intention of the agent) every unit of time, the sensory signal changes in a discrete time. Then, during a unit of time, the sensorimotor states of the agent follow a path on a plane of motor dimensions, and every time step, the plane changes.
Simulations
To explore the creation of self-organised habits we create IDSM with nodes generated by random walks in the sensorimotor medium (Egbert and Barandiaran, 2014; Egbert and Canamero, 2014; Egbert, 2018) . The medium is initialised with n n random nodes generated by performing n RW random walks in the sensorimotor space, starting from a random location and with subsequent loci calculated according to the following equation, l i+1 = l i + r, where the components of r came from a uniform distribution U[−0.05, 0.05] (if l i+1 got out of range, it was inverted). At a locus l i a node (N p = l i , N v = l i+1 − l i , N ω = 0) was added. This way of exploring the sensorimotor states does not necessarily generate a homogeneous distribution of nodes and may favour some possible sensorimotor habit. However, the assembly of agent systems allows recognising which of these habits, if formed, are maintained for a longer time given certain environmental conditions. We add an amplifier factor C IDSM which multiplies the influence of IDSM on intentions and thereto on actions to counteract the weakening of the sensory-action bond due to the stochasticity of the model. We compared two types of agents: The first type of agent uses a randomly initialised IDSM for behaviour control. The second type of agent inherits her IDSM to her descendants as if the behavioural history could be transmitted to offspring. The employed parameters are shown in Sensorimotor behaviour is identified when changes on sensory inputs follows changes on motor states which follows changes on sensory states. If a set of behaviours is sustained and appear recurrently during the life-span of the agent it is considered a habit. We use the time an agent α survives (t ext ) and the time her internal energy E α stays below the threshold E t (t dam ) to classify healthy agents. Every action is preceded by an intention represented in the motor variables p c and p m . The effective attainment of the intention of eating depends on the availability of sources. Any other decision in this model (not to eat, move and not move) are always executed by the agents as they do not depend on any external factor. Eating behaviour can be categorised as homeostatic if is a coordinating response to an stimulus which disturbs or jeopardises the agent existence. If the internal energy decreases to the point where E α (t) < E t the sensory signal changes drastically. If this trend continues the agent can rapidly leave the viability region (E α > 0) then eating is an homeostatic reaction. As the system is built, the agent can increase her willingness to eat but eating still depends on the availability of sources in the environment.
Results and discussion
On the 100 experiments in which agents always start with an untrained medium, the average time the agent survives is 188 and the mean proportion of time an agent stay below the threshold E t (close to the viability limit) is greater than a sixth. Only in one case the agent is always above the energy threshold. In 6 scenarios the agents survived 500 temporal units. In this experiments less than a half of the times the internal energy of an agent is below E t , she eats. This rate is higher than that of the complete set of agents. We can label this eating behaviour as homeostatic because it pushes the agent state into the viability region, away from the boundary. Homeostatic eating on agents depends on the perception of an state of hunger (or any sensory input of a low level of energy), the decision of eating and the availability of sources on cell. The rate of homeostatic eating (number of homeostatic eating events over number of eating events) by probability of regeneration of sources, agent by agent or aggregated, does not increase linearly with p g . The rate of homeostatic eating and the rate of eating (number of eating events over the lifespan of the agent) are moderately correlated with a longer lifespan (0.51 and 0.63 respectively). Survivors move some more frequently than all the agents but this increase does not seem to be directly related with a change on the lifespan of agents (the linear correlation is 0.1). The effect of the availability of energetic sources, captured in the parameter p g , on the strength of the linear correlation between rates of specific behaviour and the length of agent's life is summarised on appear to be more linked with an increase of lifespan for the lowest availability of energetic sources. Movement's weak direct effect on survival of agents disappears for high values of p g . This is expected as the agent's chances to find food in her current cell increases enough to make the search for food unnecessary. Moving does not correspond to a rational mechanism for seeking food or expenditure of energy but the increase of dimensions on the registered memories extends the possible ways to create habits. The direct relationship between the eating rate and lifespan is moderate in every environmental scenario. On the other hand, the homeostatic eating behaviour is moderately influential in systems with a complete availability of sources and systems with a relatively low availability. Fig 2 shows the sensorimotor dynamics of surviving agents. The variations of motor variables p c and p m follow far larger changes on the signal, and in most of the cases they have the opposite direction of ∆S(E α ). Some experiments keep the values of the motor dimensions (intention of eating and moving) close and apparently tied. The behavioural dynamic exhibited by surviving agents has not a cycle of states which could explain the fitness in the six scenarios but it shows that the transition states visited when the agent's energy is around the threshold E t generate a reaction in the motor dimensions (intentions). The distribution of the possible combined actions (eat and move, eat but not move, move but not eat, not move nor eat) is almost uniform for the complete set of agents. For survivor agents, the simultaneous execution of eating and moving increases to the detriment of static strategies. We are not imposing any a priori utility directed behaviour in agents so the pattern of intentions and actions of surviving agents come directly from the interaction with the environment, the original cognitive setting and the reinforcement of sensorimotor memories. The aggregated absolute influences of the medium through time in p c and p m are not correlated for the complete set of experiments but if we only consider surviving agents a weak correlation appears (0.308) which points to a fragile coordinated influence.
When agents transmit to their descendants their sensorimotor history they are not spreading a utility function but a resume of contingencies to be interpreted by the newborn agents in their own terms. Agents with an inherited sensorimotor history have a longer average lifespan than the first set of agents (200.37 temporal units) but less of them survive 500 generations. This result suggests that these agents have a less diversified repertoire of habits to face environmental challenges, but their means of behaviour control, moulded by generations, increases their life expectancy. There is a significant change in the distribution of the time that agents survive (p = 0.03757 on a Mann-Whitney test) but no big difference in the distribution of the time spent below the energy threshold (Fig. 3) . Agents with the inheritance of IDSM spent on average a little less time out of the viability region than their pairs without it. The distribution of combined actions does not change in comparison with agents with random IDSM. However, the improvement on lifespan appears at early generations and vanished until be imperceptible with the most distant descendants.
Conclusions
Heuristics as habits of decision-making have ideal characteristics for their study as enactive self-sustained and selfgenerated systems. We employed a model of enactive con- trol of sensorimotor events, the iterant deformable sensorimotor medium (IDSM), based on the repetition and reinforcement of previously visited states. We introduced the intention of performing actions as the motor dimensions on an iterant deformable sensorimotor medium and created an agent-based model of decisions related to energy intake and energy expenditure where agents decide stochastically if they eat sources on a cell of a periodic ring and/or if they move to one of their neighbouring cells. Those decisions are linked to an essential variable: the internal energy of the agent. The sensor dimension was built based on a sigmoidal function of the energy where the proximity with the viability limit is immediately recognised. Agents with the longest lifespan does not share a universal behavioural habit but is observed that homeostatic-eating and moving behaviour effects on fitness depends on the availability of energy on the environment. Inheritance of the iterant deformable sensorimotor medium seems to improve the outputs of the offspring but reduces the possibility to have very successful agents. This work is a first step towards an understanding of the creation of high cognitive decision-making mechanisms observed in organisms with subjective meaning. The enactive dynamical approach provides the minimal conditions for a transparent definition of heuristics as something more than an alternative mechanism. Further work needs to be carried out to endogenize some features of IDSM, as for example, the sigmoidal sensory signal of the internal energy which could be replaced by a linear signal subject to evolve over time, and to formalise the stochastic functions on the sensorimotor coupling. Figure 3 : Comparison between histograms of the lifespan of agents and the rate of time out of the viability region for agents which start with a random IDSM and agents which inherited IDSM from ancestors.
